The Future of Sodomy by Adler, Libby
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 32 | Number 2 Article 1
2005
The Future of Sodomy
Libby Adler
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Libby Adler, The Future of Sodomy , 32 Fordham Urb. L.J. 197 (2005).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol32/iss2/1
The Future of Sodomy
Cover Page Footnote
Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University. Thanks to Aaron Belkin, Taylor Flynn, and Wendy
Parmet for helpful feedback on earlier drafts, and to Jennifer Wood and James Alexander for their research
assistance. Thanks also to the organizers of the plenary session on Lawrence v. Texas at the National Lesbian
and Gay Law Foundation’s Lavender Law Conference (October 17-19, 2003) at Fordham University School
of Law, as well as to the editors of this symposium edition of the Fordham Urban Law Journal.
This article is available in Fordham Urban Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol32/iss2/1
278872-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012 12:26:13 PM 
 
101 
THE FUTURE OF SODOMY 
Libby Adler∗ 
The contaminant of sex, the redeeming corruption that de-idealizes the 
species and keeps us everlastingly mindful of the matter we are.1 
INTRODUCTION 
One evening in 1998, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner went to 
Lawrence’s house and engaged in anal intercourse.2  , Upon seeing them go 
inside a malevolent neighbor contacted the police and falsely claimed to 
have heard a gunshot coming from the direction of the house.3  When the 
police responded to the call, they stumbled upon Lawrence and Garner in 
the midst of the forbidden sexual act.4  The police arrested the two men for 
violating the Texas anti-sodomy statute,5 thereby initiating the case that 
brought the eventual demise of the notorious Bowers v. Hardwick,6 the 
1986 decision in which the Court rejected a challenge to Georgia’s anti-
sodomy law, holding that the Constitution did not confer a fundamental 
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.7 
Lawrence and Garner spent the night in jail, pled no contest to the facts, 
were fined $200 each, and left the courthouse convicted sex offenders.8  
Texas law is more lenient than that of about a dozen other states:  If the 
 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University.  Thanks to Aaron Belkin, Taylor 
Flynn, and Wendy Parmet for helpful feedback on earlier drafts, and to Jennifer Wood and 
James Alexander for their research assistance.  Thanks also to the organizers of the plenary 
session on Lawrence v. Texas at the National Lesbian and Gay Law Foundation’s Lavender 
Law Conference (October 17-19, 2003) at Fordham University School of Law, as well as to 
the editors of this symposium edition of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. 
 1. PHILIP ROTH, THE HUMAN STAIN 37 (2001). 
 2. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003); see Morning Edition with Nina 
Totenberg  (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Morning Edition]. 
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 559. 
 4. Id. at 563. 
 5. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).  The neighbor was also arrested, 
and convicted of filing a false police report.  Morning Edition, supra note 2. 
 6. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 7. Id. at 186. 
 8. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563. 
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Texas convictions had stood, they would have carried no prison time,9 
though the convicted men would have been barred from certain 
professions, includingin a law as ironic as it is ill-conceivedinterior 
design.10  Further, in some states to which they might have wished to move, 
Lawrence and Garner would have had to register as sex offenders.11 
The convictions were affirmed in the state appellate courts.12  Then, 
incredibly, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on a matter 
that had been addressed fewer than twenty years before, and proceeded to 
strike down the Texas anti-sodomy law as a violation of the substantive due 
process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
There can be no doubt about it: 2003 was a good year for sodomy.  
Bowers was a blight on American constitutional jurisprudence, one that 
rightly drew endless criticism from commentators spanning the political 
 
 9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(b). 
 10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. at 581. 
 12. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). 
 13. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see also Lawrence 539 U.S. 558.  
Oral argument before the Supreme Court was something of a bloodbath.  See Oral 
Argument of Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr. on Behalf of Texas, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 1702534.  Charles Rosenthal, the District Attorney for 
Harris County, Texas, was ill-equipped to play in the major leagues, stumbling through what 
was at times an unintelligible argument.  Continually turned around analytically, he 
sometimes seemed to say the opposite of what he must have meant, and he was not prepared 
to answer basic questions, such as whether gays and lesbians could legally adopt children in 
Texas.  See id. at 35.  Justice Scalia became so frustrated with Rosenthal’s incoherence that 
he took over for Texas, making the state’s strongest arguments from the bench.  See id. at 
31. 
  Rosenthal’s incompetence was so striking that it prompts one to wonder why 
someone so thoroughly unprepared would find himself representing Texas before the United 
States Supreme Court.  Is it possible that the relevant players in Texas agreed with Justice 
Thomas that the statute was “‘uncommonly silly,’”  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting)), yet the politics of the moment required Texas to make a showing of 
commitment to the prohibition nonetheless?  Such bad faith is not inconceivable given the 
fact that the statute had gone largely unenforced for some time, apparently on the books 
merely to express disapproval rather than actually to prohibit. 
  The selection of Rosenthal recalls a similar story that happened when Brown v. 
Board of Education was before the Court.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Apparently, the Kansas 
Attorney General was mortified to have the Board of Education of Topeka named as a 
defendant, as if Kansas were no better than Mississippi or Alabama.  For a while, Kansas 
did not act to defend itself, perhaps imagining that the case and its accompanying 
embarrassment might simply evaporate if it were ignored.  See Mary Dudziak, The Limits of 
Good Faith: Desegregation in Topeka, Kansas, 1950-1956, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 351, 370-
73 (1987).  Eventually, the Court instructed Kansas that it had to defend or concede, and 
Kansas defended.  See id.  To represent the school board at oral argument, Kansas sent a 
new lawyer who had never once argued before an appellate court, in a case in which 
opposing counsel was Thurgood Marshallpractically throwing the fight.  See id. 
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spectrum.14  In this Article, I unreservedly cast my lot with the many 
observers who celebrate Lawrence v. Texas as a tremendous advance in 
civil rights.  Rather than be lulled into complacency, however, I also read 
Lawrence with an eye toward the future, scouring the opinion for danger 
signs, andI regret to reportI have found five. 
By “danger signs,” I mean to suggest that I write as a legal realist in a 
Holmesian sense, that is, I am interested in prediction.15  What good or bad 
might come of the Lawrence decision?  To what use might the opinion be 
put by courts deliberating on future cases?  This, of course, raises in turn 
the question of what is meant by “good or bad.”  In short, I take as my 
yardsticks the following: “Good” means pro-sex and anti-identity, while 
“bad” means suspicious of sex (a.k.a. “sex negativity”) and pro-identity.  
Below, I elaborate on each of these two yardsticks and then measure the 
Lawrence opinion against them. 
I. PRO-SEX 
A. The Pro-Sex Yardstick 
Pro-sex thinking encompasses the views of a number of writers who 
might also fall under the broad categories of “feminist,” such as Gayle 
Rubin and Judith Butler, or “queer,” such as Duncan Kennedy and Michael 
Warner.  I borrow from all four, and explain what I take from each in this 
sub-part. 
1. Gayle Rubin 
In her classic essay Thinking Sex: Note for a Radical Theory of the 
Politics of Sexuality,16 Gayle Rubin identifies five “ideological formations” 
relative to sexuality, two of which I rely on in this Article.17  First, Rubin 
 
 14. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993) [hereinafter Halley, Reasoning]; see Cass 
R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1994); see also RICHARD 
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 341-48 (1992). 
 15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 15 
(William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993) (“When we study law . . . [t]he object of our study . . . 
is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality 
of the courts.”).  “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more 
pretentious, are what I mean by the law . . . .”  Id. at 17. 
 16. Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Note for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in 
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 267-319 (Carole S. Vance ed., 
1984). 
 17. The other three are 1) “fallacy of misplaced scale,” in which “everything pertaining 
to sex [is] a ‘special case’ in our culture,” 2) a “hierarchical system of sexual value,” in 
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observes that western culture “treats sex with suspicion” and “requires 
pretexts” for “the exercise of erotic capacity, intelligence, curiosity, or 
creativity . . . that are unnecessary for other pleasures such as the 
enjoyment of food, fiction or astronomy.”18  She calls this tendency “sex 
negativity” and opposes it.19  I will examine the Lawrence opinion for a 
tendency to portray sex as fundamentally suspect or requiring justification. 
Second, Rubin calls for a highly tolerant and “pluralistic sexual ethics” 
which would rest on “a concept of benign sexual variation,” in which 
sexual practices need not “conform to a single standard.”20  Rubin would 
no doubt find cause for celebration in the Lawrence Court’s provision of 
constitutional protection to a broader range of sexual activity than was 
protected before it, as do I.  The pro-sex inquiry does not, however, end 
there.  Benign sexual variation, at least as I employ the concept, would also 
require an inquiry into whether the newly protected acts are protected at the 
expense of imperiling a broader array of acts, or even the same acts 
committed in other contexts, including places and relationships. 
2. Judith Butler 
Judith Butler’s description of the “pro-sexuality [position] within 
feminist theory and practice”21 also lends something important to my 
analysis.  “[S]exuality is always constructed within the terms of discourse 
and power,” Butler explains, so that any “postulation of a normative 
sexuality that is ‘before,’ ‘outside,’ or ‘beyond’ power is a cultural 
impossibility and a politically impracticable dream, one that postpones the 
concrete and contemporary task of rethinking subversive possibilities for 
sexuality and identity within the terms of power itself.”22 
I take from Butler the added facet of the pro-sex position that while sex 
is a site of power relations that are sometimes undesirable from a feminist 
perspective, it is unhelpful to attempt to insulate sex from power, or to 
analytically segregate sex that is untainted by power from sex that is tainted 
by power.  Such an attempt at analytical segregation is unrealistic and, as a 
result, counter-productive in that it diverts our attention from more 
 
which marital, reproductive sex sits at the top of a normative hierarchy; and 3) a “domino 
theory of sexual peril,” according to which there is a line dividing “sexual order and chaos.”  
Id. at 278-84. 
 18. Id. at 278. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 283-84. 
 21. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 30 
(1990). 
 22. Id. 
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plausible avenues to progressive change that are premised on acceptance of 
the presence of power in sex.23  Following Butler, I will judge the 
Lawrence opinion based on the extent to which it demonizes the power 
dimension of sex, and attempts in its analysis to separate out for 
constitutional protection only that sex which is free of the impurities of 
power. 
3. Duncan Kennedy 
Another facet of what I am calling the “pro-sex” position comes from 
Duncan Kennedy, who, in his essay Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the 
Eroticization of Domination,24 sets forth an elaborate assessment of the 
costs and benefits to men and women associated with regulation of the 
sexual abuse of women, and the resultant relative bargaining power 
between the sexes.  I will borrow only a small piece from Kennedy’s 
analysis. 
Kennedy takes as a premise that the more aggressive a regime’s efforts 
are to eradicate the sexual abuse of women by men, the more often some 
instances of enforcement will be overzealous and result in error.25  “There 
is,” Kennedy explains, “a peculiar symmetry between the burden of excess 
enforcement and the burden of tolerated abuse.  To get rid of one, you have 
to have the other.”26  This creates “a real conflict of interests” between men 
and women over the degree to which the legal regime will tolerate abuse or 
excess enforcement.27  To the extent that abuse is tolerated, “it spares men, 
abusive and nonabusive, the burden of excess or inaccurate enforcement [as 
well as] the burden of precautions against the risk of excess 
enforcement.”28  One implication of this is that “increased enforcement 
would make men hesitate to take altogether innocent initiatives toward 
women, [while an increased] tolerated residuum [of abuse] makes women 
hesitate to take altogether innocent initiatives toward men.”29  Kennedy, 
who acknowledges that some degree of regulation and some residuum of 
abuse will always be present,30 is not a libertarian on this issue; he is 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS 
OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 126-213 (1993). 
 25. Id. at 144. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 137 (“[I]t seems likely that there would be abuse within any conceivable legal 
system, and clear that even in the complete absence of legal sanctions there would be 
significant social control of this kind of behavior through other mechanisms.”). 
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willing to risk a certain amount of excess enforcement because he also 
believes that, as a heterosexual man,31 he has something to gain from 
women’s security, i.e., that “women might fantasize, play, experiment and 
innovate more, and perhaps more happily, if there were less . . . danger [of 
abuse].”32  The calculus can get complicated, much more so in Kennedy’s 
essay, with lots of costs and benefits to parties who are neither perpetrators 
nor victims of abuse. 
One plausible response to the problem of sexual abuse is to favor 
aggressive regulation of sex, including the broadest possible definitions of 
rape and harassment, even if that policy tendency might carry costs 
associated with excess enforcement.33  Part of what I take to be the pro-sex 
position is a rejection of this approach.  I read the “sexy dressing” calculus 
to have utility beyond heterosexual relations, to suggest a more general 
symmetry between the protection of people (not just women) from sexual 
behavior and the protection of people (not just men) from the burdens of 
excess enforcement.  Any regime will have to err on one side or the other.34  
An aspect of my pro-sex yardstick, therefore, will require an inquiry into 
whether Lawrence errs on the side of protecting people from some sex at 
the cost of putting a lot of other sex at risk of exclusion from constitutional 
protection. 
4. Michael Warner 
The final dimension of what I take to be the pro-sex position concerns 
what Michael Warner has dubbed “the politics of sexual shame.”35  
“Perhaps because sex is an occasion for losing control, for merging one’s 
consciousness with the lower orders of animal desire and sensation, for raw 
confrontations of power and demand, it fills people with aversion and 
shame.”36  Sex affords no escape from shame for Warner, leading him to 
 
 31. Id. at 126. 
 32. Id. at 209. 
 33. See id. at 150-54.  For reasons that I have not even begun to give a fair hearing here, 
this sort of law reform agenda might be endorsed by a radical feminist or dominance 
feminist, such as Catherine MacKinnon or Andrea Dworkin.  Id.  Kennedy collects the 
reasoning under the section title Characterological Discipline to capture the idea of the total 
pervasiveness of male domination even within women’s consciousness.  See id. 
 34. Fran Olsen states a similar premise.  See Fran Olsen, A Feminist Analysis of 
Statutory Rape Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387 (1984).  “We want both security and 
freedom, but seem to have to choose between them.”  Id. 
 35. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS AND THE ETHICS 
OF QUEER LIFE 24 (1999).   
 36. WARNER, supra note 35, at 2.  Whether the shame of sex is a good thing or a bad 
thing is a separate question which I do not undertake here.  For discussion, see Leo Bersani, 
Is the Rectum a Grave?, in AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197, 215-18 
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pose the question not “how do we get rid of sexual shame?,” but rather 
“what will we do with our shame?”37  To Warner’s chagrin, the all-too-
frequent “response to shame seems to be: more shame.”38 
It is not so much the primary shame associated with sex that I am 
concerned with here, but the secondary “more shame.”  One manifestation 
of this secondary shame is what Warner (quoting Theodore Adorno) refers 
to as “a desexualization of sexuality itself,” exemplified by the distinctly 
unsexy notion of a “healthy sex life”39 as well as by the gay rights 
movement’s “desexualized identity politics” and its “becoming more and 
more enthralled with respectability.”40  The final facet of my pro-sex 
yardstick will measure the extent to which the Lawrence opinion responds 
to the primary sort of shame with the secondary sort. 
B. Four Signs of Danger for the Pro-Sex Position 
1. Standard of Review 
The Lawrence majority states unequivocally that it is overruling Bowers 
v. Hardwick.41  This is an extraordinary moment in the decision, not only 
because of the great personal satisfaction that it brings to the reader when 
the voice of authority condemns Bowers as erroneous, but also because it is 
so atypical for the Court to candidly proclaim its own error and its 
determination to reverse course, even while retaining three of the same 
members it had in 1986.42 
In Brown v. Board of Education,43 for example, the Warren Court leaves 
plenty of room to believe that Plessy v. Ferguson44 was correctly decided in 
1896.  Rather than condemning “separate but equal” as always having been 
wrong in principle, Chief Justice Warren reasoned that new, twentieth 
century psychological data and the increasing importance of public 
education in the industrial economy demanded the interment of the 
 
(Douglas Crimp ed., 1988). 
 37. WARNER, supra note 35, at 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. at 24-25. 
 41. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 42. The three members are Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (1981-present), Justice 
Stevens (1975-present), and Chief Justice William Rehnquist (1972-present). 
     43.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
     44.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
278872-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:13 PM 
108 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. XXXII 
“separate but equal” doctrine.45 
As Justice Scalia correctly notes in his dissent,46 however, it is not clear 
that the Lawrence Court laid waste to every stone in the Bowers edifice.  
The Lawrence majority used the language of liberty47 to strike down the 
Texas law, but declined to declare explicitly that sodomy is a fundamental 
right under the Due Process Clause, and apparently declined as a doctrinal 
consequence, to apply strict scrutiny.  The statute, the Court found, lacked 
a rational basis, applying the lowest standard of review available in 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.48 
In one sense, the decision to strike down the statute as lacking even a 
rational basis is quite powerful.  But in another sense, the application of 
rational basis review creates doctrinal space for deference to the legislature 
when the basis for a challenge to a law is Lawrence.  This has not been lost 
on lower courts. 
Just months after Lawrence, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit deliberated on the constitutionality of Florida’s total ban on gay 
adoption.49  Among the many arguments offered by the plaintiffs was one 
urging that Florida’s ban “impermissibly burdens” the “fundamental right 
to private sexual intimacy” set forth in Lawrence.50  Rejecting this 
argument (and all others proffered by the would-be adoptive parents), the 
Eleventh Circuit observed that “[n]owhere . . . did the Court characterize 
this right as ‘fundamental,’”51 nowhere in the opinion is there an “inquiry 
into the question of whether the . . . asserted right is . . . ‘deeply rooted in 
this nation’s history,’”52 and “the . . . Court never applied strict scrutiny, 
the proper standard when fundamental rights are implicated.”53  Since the 
Eleventh Circuit found no fundamental right to be at stake, even in light of 
Lawrence, it declined to decide whether the adoption ban 
 
     45.  “In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back . . . to 1896 
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.  We must consider public education in the 
light of its full development and its present place in American life . . . .”  Brown, 
347 U.S. at 492-93.  “Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [that segregation has ill 
psychological effects] is amply supported by modern authority.”  Id. at 494. 
 46. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 562-79. 
 48. Id. at 578. 
 49. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 805 (11th Cir. 
2004). 
 50. Id. at 815. 
 51. Id. at 816. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 817. 
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unconstitutionally burdened any such right.54 
Furthermore, think ahead to the gathering battle over the military policy 
known as “don’t ask, don’t tell.”55  With the ink on Lawrence barely dry, 
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Loomis, who was discharged from the army in 
1997 “Under Other than Honorable Conditions” after an arson investigation 
of a fire at his home resulted in the discovery of photographs and 
videotapes of men in sexual positions, filed suit.56  Relying on Lawrence, 
Loomis might argue that the military’s proscription against sodomy is 
unconstitutional as a violation of his right to substantive due process.  
According to the plain language of the Lawrence opinion, however, the 
military rule would be subject only to rational basis review.  It is not 
difficult to imagine, especially in this time of perpetual war, that security,57 
military morale,58 or unit cohesion59 would suffice to satisfy the low 
standard. 
While certainly no guarantee, it could be of great service to Loomis (or 
whatever soldier ultimately brings the Supreme Court challenge that 
thenceforward will bear his or her name) to have a fundamental right to 
rely on, triggering the most scrutinizing level of judicial review.  Just as the 
Bowers Court declined to find a fundamental right to sodomy, so did the 
Lawrence Court, and some future plaintiff will enter the courtroom with a 
lot less artillery than he or she might otherwise have had.60 
 
 54. Id.  The following summer, the same court deliberated on the constitutionality of 
Alabama’s ban on the sale of sex toys.  Williams v. Attorney Gen., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 
2004).  The first time this case was in the district court, the judge found no fundamental 
right, but permanently enjoined enforcement of the statute for lack of a rational basis.  Id. at 
1233.  After the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “public morality provided a rational 
basis,” the district court took a new tack on remand, finding that the ban infringed a 
fundamental right to sexual privacy, enjoining enforcement for a second time, but this time 
applying strict scrutiny.  Id. at 1234.  The Court of Appeals reversed once again, stating that 
“no Supreme Court precedents, including the recent decision in Lawrence . . . are decisive 
on the question of the existence of such a right” and that even though the petitioners in 
Lawrence “expressly invited” the Court to find a fundamental right in that case, the Court 
“declined the invitation.”  Id. at 1236.  The Court of Appeals went on to explain that it 
would not, therefore, apply strict scrutiny.  See id. at 1237. 
 55. See 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2003). 
 56. Complaint, Loomis v. United States, No. 1:03-01653 (Fed. Cl. July 7, 2003). 
 57. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 58. See Watkins v. Unites States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 59. See Aaron Belkin, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military 
Necessity?, PARAMETERS-U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE J., Summer 2003, at 108. 
 60. See also United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004), challenging an 
airman’s sodomy conviction under Lawrence.  This court observed that Lawrence contains 
language to support either the position that there is a fundamental right to engage in private, 
consensual sexual conduct triggering strict scrutiny, or the position that there is no such 
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But the opinion is not unambiguous on this point.  It is still plausible to 
construct an argument that the Lawrence Court implicitly created a 
fundamental right to sodomy or to private, consensual sexual activity 
generally.61  One could argue that the Court followed a thread that began 
with Meyer v. Nebraska62 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters63 (the early 
substantive due process cases from the 1920’s), continued through 
Griswold (in which Justice Douglas introduced the right to privacy, 
famously created by penumbras and emanations from various Bill of Rights 
guarantees),64 as well as Eisenstadt v. Baird65 and Roe v. Wade66 
(extending the right to individual reproductive choices), leading 
triumphantly to Lawrence.  This telling would locate sodomy squarely in 
the so-called “zone of privacy,”67 a zone protected in the manner of a 
fundamental right.68 
But it is equally possible that Lawrence will be understood to have 
eroded the right to privacy, bringing it down to rational basis level 
protection and depriving it of its formerly fundamental nature.  It could also 
be seen as a continuation of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,69 which can be 
read to have already dragged the right to privacy down from its 
fundamental status.  It might be understood to have resulted in tiers of 
 
fundamental right and that rational basis review applies.  Id.  Still, finding that the airman’s 
conduct occurred with a service member of a lower grade, the court determined that 
“consent might not easily be refused” on facts such as the ones presented by this case, 
thereby distinguishing Marcum from Lawrence and leaving Marcum unprotected by the 
holding in Lawrence.  Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that 
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1917 (2004).  Tribe maintains that “the 
strictness of the Court’s standard in Lawrence, however articulated, could hardly have been 
more obvious . . . .”  Id.  Tribe states that “to search for the magic words proclaiming the 
right protected in Lawrence to be ‘fundamental,’” and to “assume that in the absence of 
those words mere rationality review applied, is to universalize what is in fact only an 
occasional practice [of explicitly declaring a standard of review and to] overlook . . . 
passage after passage” in which the Court mentions substantive due process, liberty, and so 
on.  Id.  Obvious though it may be to Professor Tribe, it is apparently less obvious to the 
lower courts that so far have employed the language of Lawrence.  See, e.g., Marcum, 60 
M.J. at 198. 
 62. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 63. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 64. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that the right to privacy protects married couples 
using contraception). 
 65. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right found in Griswold to protect unmarried 
persons procuring contraception). 
 66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that abortion was protected by the right to privacy). 
 67. Id. at 152-53. 
 68. Id. at 155. 
 69. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
278872-TEXT.NATIVE.1325881553.DOC 1/6/2012  12:26:13 PM 
2005] FUTURE OF SODOMY  111 
privacy, in which the right to use contraception, for example, sits in the top 
tier while sodomy occupies some inferior position.  Finally, it could be read 
to leave intact the Bowers Court’s total breaking off of sodomy from the 
rights elaborated in the privacy line of cases.  The battle to characterize the 
right at stake in Lawrence might have been avoided by an unambiguous 
judicial declaration that sodomy is a fundamental right triggering the 
strictest level of judicial review.  Instead, sodomy is left vulnerable to a 
high level of judicial deference to majoritarian regulation, running counter 
to Rubin’s guiding principles of sex positivity and benign sexual variation. 
2. Consent 
The second matter that warrants attention is the Court’s stated reliance 
on the fact of Lawrence and Garner’s mutual consent to engage in anal 
intercourse70 and, relatedly, its relentless assurances that no minors were 
harmed in the making of this case.71 
The present case does not involve minors.  It does not involve persons 
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships 
where consent might not be easily refused . . . .  This case does involve 
two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in 
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.72 
It is perfectly understandable that the fact that Lawrence and Garner 
were two grown men, each apparently with the desire to have sex with the 
other, served to assuage any discomfort that the justices might otherwise 
have felt and inconceivable that the case would have come out as it did if it 
had involved allegations of coercion.  This case contains no such 
allegations, however, and that made it a good one on the facts from the 
perspective of the impact litigator.  But consent is a legal concept that 
could easily fail that same litigator on a different day. 
Consider, for example, the quandary posed by cases involving sado-
masochistic sex, such as the Case of Laskey, Jaggard & Brown v. United 
Kingdom,73 decided by the European Court of Human Rights.  Three 
British men were criminally charged with assault and related offenses 
“relating to sado-masochistic activities that had taken place over a ten-year 
period.”74  As the European court concedes: 
These activities were consensual and were conducted in private for no 
 
 70. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39 (1997). 
 74. Id. at 41.  
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apparent purpose other than the achievement of sexual gratification.  The 
infliction of pain was subject to certain rules including the provision of a 
code word to be used by any “victim” to stop an “assault”, and did not 
lead to any instances of infection, permanent injury or the need for 
medical attention.75 
All three defendants were convicted and sentenced to prison under 
British law.76  They appealed to the European Court on the grounds that 
their convictions violated Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms77 arguing that because “all 
those involved in the sado-masochistic encounters were willing adult 
participants,” and because there were no serious injuries sustained as a 
result of the decade of encounters, consent should constitute a defense 
against the charges.78  The government of Britain urged that consent not be 
considered a defense because the sado-masochistic activities posed a 
danger to the public health and morality.79 
Not only did the European Court find for Britain, it did so while 
expressly distinguishing the facts from those of cases that “have previously 
been examined by the Court concerning consensual homosexual behavior 
in private between adults where no such [sado-masochistic] feature was 
present.”80  The European Court did not appear to question the truth of the 
defendants’ contention that all participants in the encounters consented, but 
nonetheless treated consent as irrelevant, or at least outweighed by the 
government’s authority to interfere when it expresses a concern over the 
“potential for harm.”81  Consent does not save behavior that courts 
experience as “extreme.”82 
Furthermore, the same week it decided Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sent a case called Limon v. Kansas back to Kansas for 
 
 75. Id. at 41-42. 
 76. Id. at 42.  
 77. This article provides in relevant part as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private. . . life . . . . 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except. . .[as] is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others. 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3,1953, 
art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 78. 24 Euro. Ct. H.R. at 43, 48. 
 79. Id. at 47. 
 80. Id. at 48. 
 81. Id. at 59. 
 82. Id. at 40.  
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reconsideration.83  This case involved Matthew Limon, an eighteen-year-
old, mentally disabled male and the fourteen-year old male whom he 
fellated in the group home in which they both resided.84 
Kansas law contains a so-called “Romeo and Juliet” provision, which 
radically mitigates the penalty for statutory rape that occurs between a 
teenage boy and girl who are four or fewer years apart in age.85  Matthew 
Limon and his sexual partner were three years and one month apart.86  
Their sex was, according to both boys, consensual.87  But as one 
commentator remarked, the provision containing the mitigated penalties 
“applies only to Romeos and Juliets, not to Romeos and Mercutios.”88  
Matthew Limon was sentenced to seventeen years in prison.89  He had 
already served two when the Court sent his case back to Kansas.90  If one 
of the boys had been female, the maximum sentence would have been 
fifteen months. 
In spite of specific instructions from the United States Supreme Court to 
reconsider Limon’s case “in light of Lawrence,”91 the Kansas Court of 
Appeals found Lawrence distinguishable92 due to Justice Kennedy’s 
emphasis on the fact of Lawrence and Garner’s both having been adults.  
“[C]hildren are excluded,”93 the Kansas court found.  “Because the present 
case involved a 14-year-old developmentally disabled child, it is factually 
distinguishable from Lawrence.”94 
The Lofton court, deliberating on Florida’s gay adoption prohibition, 
 
 83. Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003). 
 84. David Stout, Justices Void Prison Term Given Gay Teenager in Kansas, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/27/politics/27CND-
SCOTUS.html?ei=5070&en=fe9d555. 
 85. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 3522 (2002). 
 86. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 243 (Kan. App. 2004). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Michael Bronski, The Other Matthew, BOSTON PHOENIX, Feb. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news%5Ffeatures/other%5Fstories/documents/0270
4491.htm. 
 89. Stout, supra note 84. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955, 955 (2003). 
 92. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 234 (Kan. App. 2004).  Interestingly, the state supreme 
court’s initial decision, which was appealed to the United States Supreme Court the same 
term as Lawrence, found Bowers to be controlling.  Id.  The purported reversal of Bowers in 
Lawrence, however, was then found by the intermediate appellate court of the state not to be 
pertinent.  Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  This case is not over yet.  There is still a possibility of a reversal in the state 
supreme court, in a federal district court acting pursuant to its habeas power, or in the 
United States Supreme Court. 
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made similar use of the limiting language in Lawrence.  After reciting 
Justice Kennedy’s remark that Lawrence “[did] not involve minors,”95 the 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “[h]ere, the involved actors are not only 
consenting adults, but minors as well,”96 and concluded that “Lawrence 
does not control the present case.”97  The court seems not to have noticed 
an important distinction that might have removed the Lofton case from the 
domain of Lawrence’s exclusion: while adoption plainly involves minors, it 
bears no connection to minors engaging in sexual activity.  One might 
query whether the specter of the homosexual pedophile lingers between 
these lines of text. 
Additionally, in Marcum,98 a recent case out of the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces challenging the military prohibition against sodomy in 
light of Lawrence, the court thwarted the convicted service member’s 
efforts based on consent.  Though the facts indicate willing and drunken 
participation by the defendant and accuser in same-sex sexual activity, the 
accuser was of a lower military grade than the defendant, providing a slim 
but apparently adequate basis upon which to distinguish Marcum from 
Lawrence.99  Noting that a lower-ranking service member “might be 
coerced,” the court rejected Marcum’s challenge under Lawrence, despite 
nothing in the record to indicate coercion.100 
Even where neither age nor position is the issue, same-sex touching 
seems to strike some people as less consensual than heterosexual touching 
of the same character.  Recall the delayed vote on V. Gene Robinson’s 
appointment to the position of bishop in the Episcopal Church following 
charges that he had inappropriately touched the arm of a male parishioner 
at a meeting several years before.101 
Gay and transsexual panic defenses to murder lend themselves to a 
similar analysis.  For example, despite clear evidence of strangulation, self-
proclaimed heterosexual William Palmer was acquitted of charges that he 
 
 95. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 805, 817 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (challenging, unsuccessfully, 
an airman’s sodomy conviction under Lawrence).  Finding that the airman’s conduct 
occurred with a service member of a lower grade, the court determined that “consent might 
not easily be refused” on facts such as the ones presented by this case, thereby 
distinguishing Marcum from Lawrence. 
 99. Id. at 207-08. 
 100. Id. at 208. 
 101. Monica Davey, Gay Bishop Wins in Episcopal Vote; Split Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2003, at A1. 
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murdered Chanelle Pickett, a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual, 
whom he met in a known transsexual hangout in Boston and took home.102  
Witnesses said he frequented the bar and had dated several pre- and post-
operative transsexuals, but Palmer claimed that he did not know what he 
was getting into, and that he panicked when he was confronted with 
Pickett’s penis.103  In a verdict that left the Boston transgender community 
in despair, Palmer was convicted of only simple assault and battery, an 
offense carrying a maximum penalty of two-and-a-half years.104  The 
impression that Palmer was defrauded by Pickett, that he did not really 
consent to the particular encounter in which he found himself, appears to 
have rescued him from a murder conviction.  Palmer was the one on trial in 
this case, but his panic, or perhaps regret, was taken by the jury as 
something like an absence of consent, almost as if it were Pickett on trial 
for an illegal touching. 
The concept of consent is subject to manipulation.  It might help in the 
next case, but it also might provide a convenient way to distinguish the 
next case from Lawrence.105  Furthermore, consent is often seen as 
compromised where same-sex encounters are concerned.  The limiting 
language of Justice Kennedy’s opinion poses a distinct threat to a pro-sex 
agenda in that it tends to err on the side of protecting people from sex and 
imagines that some sex occurs outside of power. 
3. Privacy 
The third point concerns the concept of privacy.  Calling sex “the most 
private of human conduct”106 and the home “the most private of spaces,”107 
the Lawrence Court “acknowledge[d] that adults may choose to enter upon 
this [sexual] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”108  Though 
Lawrence does not explicitly invoke the “right to privacy,” the Court points 
out more than once that the case “does not involve public conduct.”109 
But, as the right-wing Family Research Council recognized in its brief in 
 
 102. Francie Latour, Sibling Decries Murder Acquittal. Verdict is Assault in Transexual’s 
Death, BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 1997, at B1. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Olsen, supra note 34, at 387. 
 106. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 560 (stating that “this case does not involve . . . public conduct or 
prostitution”); see id. at 578 (reiterating that “it does not involve public conduct or 
prostitution”). 
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support of Texas, states criminalize all sorts of private behavior.110  It is 
hard to imagine a viable position that would confer absolute immunity 
upon all conduct that happens within the home.111  Some desirable uses of 
state power require a willingness to intrude. 
Privacy is granted to activities that the justices can tolerate; we learned 
in Lawrence that a majority of them can tolerate sodomy.  Like consent, 
however, privacy is malleable.  Intolerable acts, wherever performed, may 
still fall outside of its purview, as acts deemed domestic violence or child 
abuse often do.112 
Foundational to privacy is the classical liberal notion propounded by 
John Stuart Mill a century-and-a-half ago in his essay On Liberty: 
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the 
interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question 
whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering 
with it, becomes open to discussion.  But there is no room for entertaining 
any such question when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no 
persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like . . . .113 
Of course, Mill’s formulation leaves unanswered the question of what can 
fairly be said to “affect” others.114  Imagine a same-sex couple kissing at 
the movies, and maybe groping a little.  This conduct is routinely tolerated 
when engaged in by heterosexual pairs, but sensibilities may differ where 
same-sex couples are involved.  If a same-sex movie-going couple is 
charged with, say, some variety of lewdness, the two might allege unequal 
treatment, pointing to Lawrence to bolster their position. 
But the couple committed the offense not in private, but in a movie 
 
 110. Brief of Amici Curiae of the Family Research Council, Inc. at 4-5, Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470066. 
 111. See Olsen, supra note 34, at 392. 
 112. But see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (illustrating that the obverse is also 
true: tolerable acts performed in public spaces may be protected by the right to privacy, such 
as purchasing contraception). 
 113. JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS: ON LIBERTY 92-93 (1869). 
 114. See id. at 95.  Mill only gets more conflicted in the details.  For example, he states, 
“[t]here is a degree of folly [that] may be called . . . depravation of taste, which, though it 
cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and 
properly a subject of distaste, or . . . even contempt.”  Mill continues, “[w]e have a right . . . 
to act upon our unfavourable opinion . . . not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the 
exercise of ours.  We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to 
avoid it.”  Id.  A few pages later, Mill then states, “if by his vices or follies a person does no 
direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought 
to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his 
conduct might corrupt or mislead.”  Id. at 98-99.  How might Mill’s guidelines play out in 
the hypothetical discussed next in the main text?  See id. at 120-23 (revealing that Mill runs 
into difficulties applying his theory to prostitution and gambling). 
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theater.115  A hostile Court could draw an easy line here, thanks to the 
Lawrence Court’s reliance on privacy.  The movie-goers will have to fight 
it out instead over the meaning of lewdness. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently had occasion to 
construe its “open and gross lewdness” statute116 in Commonwealth v. 
Quinn.117  Patrick Quinn lowered his pants in front of a crowd of girls not 
far from their parochial school in Boston, exposing not his genitalia, but his 
thong and buttocks.118  A police officer arrested Quinn for open and gross 
lewdness, upon which Quinn exclaimed: “You stupid mother fucker you 
don’t have indecent exposure.  I didn’t pull my prick out.  I only pulled 
down my pants.  It’s not against the law to pull your pants down and show 
people your thongs.”119 
Quinn’s eloquent defense led him to the state’s highest court, which 
considered the question of whether “exposure or attempted exposure of 
genitalia [is] an essential element of an open and gross lewdness 
offense.”120  Notwithstanding the asserted permissibility of such attire on 
public beaches,121 the answer, the Massachusetts court determined, is no.122  
Exposure of Quinn’s buttocks was sufficient to bring him under the 
purview of the lewdness statute because under the circumstancesoutside 
a parochial school rather than at the beachhis conduct caused “alarm or 
shock.”123 
Will the parent with young children in the movie theater fret over the 
public display of same-sex affection and its potential shock to young eyes?  
Will the judge sympathize and find that the couple’s conduct was in fact 
shocking?  What conduct should be understood to “affect” others?  In the 
case of the movie-going couple charged under one of a variety of lewdness 
statutes, what indeed? 
Privacy necessarily excludes some conduct, leaving it unprotected 
 
 115. See supra Part I.B.4.  Privacy has a non-spatial element as well, as the Lawrence 
Court makes clear.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562(2003).  That aspect of privacy is 
close to the concepts of autonomy and dignity as the Court uses those terms. 
 116. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 16 (2003). 
 117. 789 N.E.2d 138 (Mass. 2003). 
 118. Id. at 140. 
 119. Id. at 142. 
 120. Id. at 140. 
 121. Id. at 147. 
 122. Id.  The Court’s decision prompted one local paper to run the headline “One Thong 
Doesn’t Make a Right.”  Heidi Masek, One Thong Doesn’t Make a Right, W. ROXBURY 
BULL. (West Roxbury, Mass.), June 5, 2003, at 1. 
 123. Quinn, 789 N.E. 2d at 144-45.  The Massachusetts court also found that Quinn did 
not have fair notice that the statute would be so construed, and therefore freed Quinn from 
prosecution for this incident.  Id. at 146. 
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against the vagaries of public prejudice, but ultimately, whether the 
prohibited conduct occurs in private or public, it will be subjected to a test 
of moral approbation.124  This poses a threat from the pro-sex perspective 
because it could provide an opportunity and a rationale for narrowing the 
range of tolerated sexual activity in favor of protecting other sensibilities. 
The Limon and Lofton courts already have exploited factual differences 
between their cases and Lawrence regarding privacy.  The concurring judge 
in Limon reasoned that “Lawrence involved two consenting adults having 
sexual relations in the privacy of their home.  This case involves an adult 
having sex with a minor in a state-run facility.”125  Similarly, the Lofton 
court stated that 
[t]he decision to adopt a child is not a private one, but a public act . . . . 
[P]rospective adoptive parents are electing to open their homes and their 
private lives to close scrutiny by the state .  .  . . Accordingly, such 
intrusions into private family matters are on a different constitutional 
plane than those that “seek[] to foist orthodoxy on the unwilling by 
banning or criminally prosecuting” nonconformity.126 
Privacy might intuitively seem a conceptual friend to civil rights litigators 
trying to advance rights associated with sex and family, but as these 
examples illustrate, it is no guarantee. 
Two final points regarding privacy.  First, Aaron Belkin and Melissa S. 
Embser-Herbert have shown how privacy rationales have been turned 
around on gays in the military.  Expressing a “right” to shower and bunk 
free from the leering eyes of gay fellow soldiers, opponents of gays in the 
military cite privacy in support of anti-gay exclusion.127 
 
 124. I have made a similar argument in the context of child abuse.  See Libby S. Adler, 
The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 27-28 (2001) (arguing that “the label ‘child abuse’ represents 
the point at which the sphere of parental autonomy bumps up against the needs of the 
community; it is the boundary around the acceptable range of family diversity.”). 
 125. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 241 (2004). 
 126. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 810-11 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 55 n.11 (1997)). 
 127. Aaron Belkin & Melissa S. Embser-Herbert, A Modest Proposal: Privacy as a 
Rationale for Excluding Gays and Lesbians from the U.S. Military, 27 INT’L SECURITY 2 
(2002).  This turnabout on privacy resembles some other turnabouts in equality 
argumentation.  For example, in United States v. Virginia, Virginia defended the male-only 
admission policy at its state military academy, VMI, on diversity grounds: “diversity” in this 
argument referred to a diversity of educational programs, rather than to an integrated 
environment.  So-called “states’ rights” arguments strike me similarly: by framing the 
state’s position in terms of rights, even as the state’s position runs contrary to a federally 
protected individual right to something like equal protection or due process, the states’ 
rights proponents appropriate some of the rhetorical power that might otherwise have 
belonged solely to the individual seeking federal rights protection from state infringement.  
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Secondly, privacy carries a special danger when gay people rely on it.  It 
is difficult to tell where privacy ends and closetedness begins.128  It is 
difficult to tell when privacy promotes respect for same-sex relations, and 
when it suggests that those who engage in same-sex relations ought to be 
ashamed and wish to hide.  This brings me to the next matter. 
4. Dignity 
Ubiquitous in Justice Kennedy’s opinion is newfound judicial respect for 
gay dignity and angst over the degradation of gay people and their sex: 
 To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in 
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just 
as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.129 
 [A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of 
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons.  When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with 
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring.130 
 The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.  The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime.131 
I have no doubt that all of this is well-intended, humane, and empathetic, 
but we do not know that Lawrence and Garner went to Lawrence’s house to 
have some dignity; we do know they went to have some sex.  They may 
also have hoped for a “personal bond [that would be] more enduring,” but 
they may not have, and I do not see why that fact should be pertinent to 
their claim.132 
 
518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996). 
 128. See, e.g., Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 
1455 (1992).  See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 777-79 
(1989), for the idea that protection provided for same-sex sodomy by the concept of privacy 
comes at a cost.  The protection is granted on the grounds that sexual activity is central to 
one’s “personhood.”  See id.  The close link asserted between conduct and personhood by 
this formulation weds those who engage in the conduct to gay identity, something that might 
not be desirable at all times to all people who wish to engage in the act.  See id. 
 129. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566 (2003). 
 130. Id. at 568. 
 131. Id. at 572. 
 132. In fact, Lawrence and Garner never claimed to have been in a long-term 
relationship.  Still, that they might have acquires a fair amount of mileage in this case.  The 
possibility of an enduring bond is the face of the operation, though the one-night stand gains 
constitutional protection, as well. 
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Perhaps some discussion of vocabulary would be helpful here.  Dignity 
is in vogue at the moment.  The new European Constitution, yet to be 
ratified, guarantees Europeans their dignity,133 as do the existing German 
and South African constitutions.134  German and South African history 
leave little mystery as to why dignity was thought to be a key principle 
necessitating a constitutional warranty, and Europe as a whole is no doubt 
following suit for the same reasons.135  The text of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms does not contain a dignity guarantee, but it 
nonetheless turns up in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence from time to 
time.136  Human rights activists often advocate for a universal right to 
human dignity137 that could be invoked to indict acts of torture, starvation, 
genocide, and other types of brutality. 
But dignity can also refer to something we might find less basic, less 
universal, and less suitable to constitutional guarantee, as in “sit up straight, 
cross your legs, and try to look dignified.”  The coronation of the queen, no 
doubt, is a dignified affair.  A pie-eating contest is not.  Michael Warner 
sets forth an analogous pair of meanings: 
One is ancient, closely related to honor, and fundamentally an ethic of 
rank.  It is historically a value of nobility.  It requires soap . . . .  The other 
is modern and democratic.  Dignity in the latter sense is not pomp and 
distinction; it is inherent in the human.  You can’t, in a way, not have 
it.138 
To the extent that dignity as it is used by the Lawrence Court is merely 
that which is inherent in our human impulse toward physical intimacy, sex 
is dignified by tautology.  This creates an interesting paradox: If, as Warner 
maintains, shame is inherent in sex, and dignity is inherent in the human, 
 
 133. 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, art. I-2 (“The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity . . . .”). 
 134. Grundgesetz (GG) (German Const.) art. 1 (“Human Dignity is inviolable.  To 
Respect and Protect it is the Duty of all State Authority.”);  S. AFR. CONTS. (Act 108 of 
1996) ch. 1, 1(a) (“The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded 
on the following values: a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms”).   
 135. See James Q. Whitman, On Nazi “Honour” and the New European “Dignity,” in 
DARKER LEGACIES OF LAW IN EUROPE: THE SHADOW OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND FASCISM 
OVER EUROPE AND ITS LEGAL TRADITIONS [PIN CITE?], 243-73 (Christina Joerges & Navraj 
Singh eds., 2003).  This essay actually disclaims the common perception, offering a contrary 
view that the German concept of dignity follows from a longstanding German idea about 
honor, with a history that can be traced back to a tradition of dueling and through the 
populism of the Nazi era.  Id. 
 136. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. v. M. & H., [1999] S.C.R. 1348 (Can.). 
 137. See, e.g., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (Jan Brownlie ed., 1994). 
 138. WARNER, supra note 35, at 36. 
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presumably including human sexuality, then “only when this indignity of 
sex is spread around the room, leaving no one out, and in fact binding 
people together, [can we begin to see] the dignity of the human.”139  The 
paradox is “dignity in shame.”140 
But dignity-speak is meant to do something else in Lawrence, or it 
would not have been necessary for Justice Kennedy to mention the 
possibility that Lawrence and Garner’s activity might have been but one 
facet of a “personal bond . . . more enduring,” thereby distinguishing one 
kind of sex (the kind that takes place within an enduring relation) from 
another kind (the kind that doesn’t).  The Lawrence Court’s use of dignity 
raises the following questions: Did the Bowers Court really “demean 
[Hardwick’s] claim” by treating it as if it were merely a claim about sex?  
Why does sexjust sex, with or without a “personal bond . . . more 
enduring”—lack the vitality to sustain a right on its own?  And why do we 
have to dress sex up in pretty clothes for court?  Sex is notas my mother 
might saythe coronation of the queen.141  It’s time we admitted it.  Why 
the pretense? 
I raise the issue because I fear that the answer is shame.142  I fear that the 
insistence on the dignity of gay sex is in bad faith, that gay rights advocates 
as well as sympathetic justices “protest too much,”143  thereby betraying 
their own dark suspicions and collaborating, ultimately, in the politics of 
shame. 
The pretense that sex is dignified (according to the non-tautological 
meaning) runs contrary to the anti-shame (secondary type) facet of the pro-
sex position.  The Lawrence opinion could have done more good by 
regarding sex as dignified in its tautological and paradoxical sense. 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
141.  Warner writes: 
It might as well be admitted that sex is a disgrace.  We like to say nicer things 
about it: that it is an expression of love, or a noble endowment of the Creator, or 
liberatory pleasure.  But . . . [i]f the camera doesn’t cut away at the right moment, 
or if the door is thrown open unwontedly, or the walls turn out to be too thin, all 
the fine dress of piety and pride will be found tangled around one’s ankles. 
Id. 
 142. See supra Part I.A. 
 143. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK Act III, scene ii (1601) 
(“The lady protests too much, methinks.”). 
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II. ANTI-IDENTITY 
A. The Anti-Identity Yardstick 
As a distinct, but not wholly unrelated matter, I take as another yardstick 
that rationales that entrench an injured gay identity do damage, even where 
principles of equality appear to have been served.  This idea comprises 
several interrelated parts.  Here I rely on three additional thinkers, Michel 
Foucault, Wendy Brown, and Friedrich Nietszche, because together they 
illuminate the danger of identity-based argument. 
To begin with, we should be attuned to a judicial decision’s exertion of 
power through classification.  When Homer Plessy appealed his conviction 
under the Louisiana railway segregation statute, for example, he argued 
that the railway company unlawfully maintained authority under the statute 
to classify him as black instead of white.144  The Louisiana court rejected 
his argument, finding that as long as Plessy was in fact black (and 
implicitly finding that he was) the railway could classify him as such for 
purposes of assigning him to the black car.145  It was based on this 
assumption that the court considered (and rejected) Plessy’s equal 
protection claim.  The equality claim makes sense only if Plessy is already 
black; definition of the categories and placement of people in them are 
necessary analytical steps in an equal protection context.  In taking those 
steps, the Court exerts power by effectively defining blackness and 
whiteness. “Disciplinary power,” as Foucault explained, “manifests its 
potency, essentially, by arranging objects,”146that is, by classification.  
Intuitively appealing though they may be, equality arguments require 
classifications, in this case, gay and straight.147  They also require that the 
categories relied upon be defined in a way that seems analytically coherent, 
sometimes at the expense of the more complicated facts on the ground, as 
was the case for Homer Plessy, who, it seems, would have preferred not to 
have to assert his equality with white people, but rather his non-
differentiation from them. 
An important re-enforcement mechanism to the process of classification 
 
 144. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 951 (La. 1892); see also Katherine M. Franke, The 
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995) (analogizing between classification by race in Plessy and 
classification by sex under contemporary sex discrimination law). 
 145. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 951. 
 146. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 187 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE]. 
 147. Id. 
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is the dispensation of penalties and rewards.148  Individuals subjected to the 
tandem of these two institutional practices might be disciplined into 
conformance with the norms of their class.149  So, for example, a judicial 
decision or line of case law might reward claimants with legal victory for 
performing the role of the injured gay subject (while punishing the failure 
to do so with defeat).150  This might easily result in litigators’ premising 
future actions on the existence of people identified as injured gays. 
By exercising the power of classification and rewarding members of an 
injured class for their dutiful performance of the role of injured subjects, 
equality-based legal victories produce parties who understand themselves 
as objects in the subordinate category, the category whose objects are said 
to be equal to the objects in the super-ordinate category.  As Foucault 
warned, “[w]e must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power 
in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses’ . . . .  In fact, power produces; 
it produces reality; it produces domains of objects . . . .”151  And these 
domains are not arranged neutrally, but hierarchically (i.e., producing 
subordinates),152 leading Wendy Brown to ask whether a claim for legal 
protection of an identity-group “discursively entrenches the injury-identity 
connection.”153 
The later Foucault of The History of Sexuality154 is less devoted to the 
idea of hierarchy in favor of a more complex and diffuse understanding of 
power.  It was the later Foucault who described power as a “multiplicity of 
force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate”155  and as 
always entailing resistance.156  According to this later Foucaultian 
conception, power does not merely consist in “the sovereignty of the state, 
the form of the law, or the overall unity of a domination,”157 but as 
sometimes coming “from below,”158 as part of “the interplay of 
 
 148. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 146, at 180. 
 149. Id. at 184. 
 150. Id.  Foucault’s idea about reward and punishment was closely tied to promotion or 
demotion in rank, and so was even more entwined with classification than it is in my 
presentation.  See id. at 179-84. 
 151. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 146, at 194. 
 152. Id. at 182. 
 153. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 21 
(1995). 
 154. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert 
Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY]. 
 155. Id. at 92. 
 156. Id. at 95. 
 157. Id. at 92. 
 158. Id. at 94. 
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nonegalitarian and mobile relations.”159 
Following this idea, it would not make sense to regard even an injured or 
subordinated identity group as lacking in power.  Wendy Brown’s above-
quoted passage continues: “Might . . . protection [of an injured identity 
group] codify within the law the very powerlessness it aims to redress?”160  
I agree with Brown’s general idea here, but have to quibble with the word 
“powerlessness.”  Gays may be subordinates in a hierarchical binary, but 
they are surely far from powerless.  The question is not whether they have 
any power, but what is the nature of the power they face as well as of the 
power/resistance they exercise?161 
While the Foucault of Discipline and Punish illuminates the productive 
power of classification and the mechanisms of reward and punishment, the 
later Foucault of power/resistance leads to the last component of the 
concern animating the anti-identity yardstick.  When reading a line of case 
law such as Bowers and Lawrence, we should examine it not only for the 
nature of the power exercised on the claimants (through classification, 
reward and punishment, and production of subordinates), but for 
power/resistance in its relational sense.162  In particular, I will be looking 
for the nature of the power/resistance exerted from belowi.e., from the 
subordinated claimants that seek liberation from the anti-sodomy laws. 
In The Genealogy of Morals,163 Nietzsche complains of ressentiment, or 
the elevation of “reactive feelings . . . to a position of honour.”164  By 
reactive, Nietzsche means feelings of rancor that arise out of injury and 
weakness.165  He was particularly concerned with the law’s granting 
revenge to injured parties “as if justice were at bottom merely an extension 
of the feeling of injury,”166 but I take his point a bit more broadly to 
describe the character of a source of “power from below” in Foucaultian 
terms.  The question then, finally, asked in application of the anti-identity 
yardstick, is whether litigators interested in combating unjust sex laws will 
find that, in the particular discourse of that battle, their own greatest source 
of power/resistance lies in ressentiment, specifically in this case, in serving 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. BROWN, supra note 153, at 21. 
 161. FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, supra note 154, at 97.  “[T]he question that we must address 
[is] . . . .  [in] a specific type of discourse . . . what were the most immediate, the most local 
power relations at work?”  Id. 
 162. Id. at 95. 
 163. FRIEDRICH NIETZCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (Douglas Smith trans., 1996) 
(1887). 
 164. Id. at 54. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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up an injured, gay client, thereby entrenching (Brown, now) the injured gay 
identity.167 
One could be unoffended by the phenomenon of ressentiment in general 
and of the injured gay identity in particular.  Admittedly, there is a certain 
arbitrary subjectivity to my distaste for it.  The strongest pitch to the 
unoffended is this: classification, production of subordinates, penalty and 
reward, and the power of ressentiment do not amount to a one-time 
progression which might head somewhere better later, but to a cycle.  After 
ressentiment comes classification againfollowed again by reward and the 
reproduction of identity.  If one has a hope for gay liberation or gay 
equality, it seems to me utterly unattainable so long as one is required to 
continue being gay to have it. 
Where there is a choice,168 therefore, I favor constitutional reasoning 
that protects sexual acts rather than groups defined by sexual identity.169  
Alliance around acts would serve both a pro-sex and anti-identity agenda. 
(This is why I said at the beginning of this Part that the anti-identity 
yardstick is not wholly unrelated to my pro-sex yardstick.)  The final piece 
of my analysis will be an assessment of the decision’s tendency to submit 
to this cycle. 
B. Danger Sign for the Anti-Identity Position 
The final danger sign might not yet seem obvious. Since Lawrence was 
decided not on equal protection grounds, but on substantive due process 
grounds, the first alert to the anti-identity positionclassificationis 
unnecessary.  Only Justice O’Connor argued in her concurrence that the 
statute ought to have been struck down as violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause.170  Remarking (quite improbably) that she is “confident . . . that so 
long as the Equal Protection Clause requires a sodomy law to apply equally 
to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and heterosexuals alike, 
such a law would not long stand in our democratic society,”171  Justice 
 
 167. Cf. Janet E. Halley, Gay Rights and Identity Imitation: Issues in the Ethics of 
Representation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (pin?), 117-18 (David 
Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998). 
 168. It is not clear to me that there is always a choice.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional provision that isolated sexual 
orientation as a basis upon which the state and its subdivisions were bound to deny certain 
legal protections). 
 169. Halley, Reasoning, supra note 14, at 1744-72. 
 170. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 171. Id.  at 584.  Justice O’Connor’s remark is improbableeven inexplicablebecause, 
as the main opinion states, nine of the thirteen states that maintained prohibitions against 
sodomy at the time Lawrence was before the Court prohibited the conduct for different-sex 
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O’Connor urged the Court not to reach the substantive due process issue.172 
Fortunately, five members declined to dispose of the matter under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  If the Court had done as Justice O’Connor 
wished, states that wanted to continue to criminalize sodomy could merely 
have redrawn their statutes in sex-neutral terms, as Justice Kennedy notes 
in his opinion for the majority.173  The homophobia animating those 
prohibitions might more easily have been swept under the carpet and 
equality-based legal challenges would have had to travel the more difficult 
road of alleging uneven enforcementor we might have seen a later due 
process challenge anyway.  The majority’s decision to strike down the 
statute on due process grounds avoids this pitfall. 
But there would have been another down-side to an equal protection-
based decision that Justice Kennedy does not discuss: it would have had a 
disciplinary effect in the Foucaultian sense.174  Bowers already punishes 
litigators with a virulent and shaming rebuke to the fundamental rights 
claim made in that case.  If litigators had gained an equal protection victory 
in Lawrence, the pair of cases would have sent litigators the unmistakable 
message that to get a big win, they have to frame their claims in the mode 
of gay identity. 
Now here’s the rub: the majority’s due process reasoning did not 
manage to avoid this hazard entirely.  Notice what is never said in Bowers 
and is only barely acknowledged in Lawrence: the act of sodomy and the 
identity of being gay are not perfect corollaries.175  While the Lawrence 
Court managed to differentiate state sodomy laws that prohibit only same-
sex sexual acts from those that were drafted without regard to the sexes of 
the participants,176 there is no real effort to disaggregate the conduct of 
sodomy from the identity of being gay, and the opinion contains a good 
deal of slippage between the two concepts.177  This slippage suggests a 
certain inextricability of homosexuality from sodomy.  By failing to 
extricate the two concepts and even suggesting their inherent 
interrelatedness, the Court engaged a close cousin of equal protection.  The 
opinion therefore contains the promise of reward for essentially the same 
 
as well as same-sex couples. 
 172. Id. at 578. 
 173. See id. at 576. 
 174. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 146. 
 175. See Halley, Reasoning, supra note 14, at 1722. 
 176. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(addressing state sodomy laws that prohibit same-sex sexual acts). 
 177. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003).  “This case does involve two 
adults who . . . engaged in sexual practices common to the homosexual lifestyle.”  Id. at 
560. 
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identification of litigants as injured gay subjects. 
Of course, it is true that Foucault took pains to confine his explanation of 
reward and punishment to institutions such as schools and armies that rank 
individuals, and to distinguish this idea about reward and punishment from 
the work of courts, which “operate[] not by differentiating individuals, but 
by specifying acts . . . by bringing into play the binary opposition of the 
permitted and the forbidden.”178  In the case of sodomy, however, the Court 
behaves more like a school, in that the reward entrenches the categories of 
gay and straight, not merely of offender and non-offender vis a vis a 
forbidden act.  The case can be read to have categorized Lawrence and 
Garner, not merely as persons guilty of committing the prohibited conduct, 
but as the type of people who commit such conduct, granting them their 
equality as gay people, quietly defining gay people as people who commit 
sodomy.179 
Almost as if it were an equal protection victory, Lawrence has created 
the possibility of a trap: only by occupying the subordinate category, will 
the “gay-litigant-seeking-equality” be rewarded with victory, but the “gay-
litigant-seeking-equality” also delivers himself or herself to the legal 
system as gay, that is, as subordinate in the gay/straight binary. 
Lawrence, then, presents the same danger that an equal protection-based 
decision would have presented.  Litigators concerned with unjust sex laws 
might easily have learned, through the mechanisms of reward and 
punishment, to deliver their clients to the legal system as gay, thereby 
relying on and reinscribing their subordination, taking a calculable step 
forward, but also an incalculable step back. 
Only one person in this story made a serious effort to raise the point that 
the identity of gay and the practice of sodomy are not entirely coextensive.  
Believe it or not, it was District Attorney Rosenthal.180  In an effort to 
undermine Lawrence and Garner’s equal protection claim, Rosenthal said 
at oral argument: 
[T]here’s nothing in the record to indicate that these people are 
homosexuals.  They’re not homosexuals by definition if they commit one 
act.  It’s our position that a heterosexual person can also violate this code 
if they [sic] commit an act of deviate sexual intercourse with another of 
 
 178. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE supra note 146, at 183. 
 179. The only way around this that I can conceive would have been an equal protection 
rationale where the classifications were not gay and straight, but people who commit 
sodomy and people who do not.  This strikes me as interesting but unlikely. 
 180. Oral Argument of Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr. on Behalf of Texas, Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 1702534. 
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the same sex.181 
At this point, Justice Scalia could be heard to say “I’m confused,”182 but 
don’t believe for a minute that he really was. 
A primary target for critics of Bowers was Justice White’s framing of the 
question before the Court: “The issue presented is whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy.”183  Commentators blasted the Court for this articulation because 
it exhibited what Justice Blackmun in dissent described as “willful 
blindness.”184  The Georgia statute at issue in Bowers did not specify the 
sexes of the participants185 but Justice White feigned blindness to the plain 
language of the Georgia law, as well as to a heap of undeniable facts on the 
ground that would have caused a great deal of trouble for the categories 
upon which his analysis relied. 
First, sodomy, defined as oral sex, anal sex, or penetration with an 
object,186 encompasses acts that are available to and engaged in by 
different-sex pairs.187  Second, some who claim a gay identity and engage 
in sexual activity with persons of the same-sex do not engage in acts 
included in most definitions of sodomy.188  Third, as DA Rosenthal 
observed, someone who identifies as heterosexual and does in fact engage 
predominantly in heterosexual activity can surely engage in an act of 
homosexual sodomy.189  The messy reality of sexual identities and 
practices had to be excluded from the Bowers Court’s line of sight.  If it 
had been admitted, the neat categories of homosexual and heterosexual 
would have crumbled and the misleadingly seamless procession from 
sodomy-the-conduct to homosexuals-the-people would have come apart. 
When the Lawrence Court cites to scholarly criticism of Bowers, it cites 
to Charles Fried,190 the libertarian former Solicitor General under Ronald 
 
 181. Id.  
 182. All Things Considered with Nina Totenberg (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 26, 2003). 
This comment was not recorded in the transcript of oral argument. 
 183. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 190 (1986). 
 184. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 185. See id. at 188 n.1. 
 186. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 2003).  Statutory definitions 
differ, of course.  The Georgia statute at issue in Bowers did not include penetration with an 
object.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
 187. Halley, Reasoning, supra note 14, at 1722. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citing C. FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: 
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRST HAND ACCOUNT 81-84 (1991)). 
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Reagan, and to Richard Posner,191 the well-known libertarian legal 
economist.  Critics who targeted the conflation of sodomy and gay identity 
are not cited by the Lawrence Courtat least not on this point.192 
More importantly, although the Court explicitly disclaimed reliance on 
the Equal Protection Clause, equality principles figure prominently in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, often deeply entangled with his due process 
reasoning.  Here are some of Justice Kennedy’s words: 
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.193   
Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy . . . just as 
heterosexual persons do.194   
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that 
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons 
to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.195 
Of course, I favor legal protection of the sexual practices at issue, 
whether engaged in by different or same-sex pairs, and I agree that anti-
sodomy laws have created opportunities for anti-gay harassment, 
discrimination, and violence, just as Justice Kennedy observes.  My 
concern lies rather with the persistent refusal, even by the Lawrence Court, 
to acknowledge the prevalence of acts of sodomy among people with wide-
ranging sexual preferences and identities.196  The confused entanglement so 
brutally promoted by Justice White in his framing of the issue in Bowers is 
left undisturbed in Lawrence, even as the Lawrence Court reaches for the 
Due Process Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court is not the only one to blame for this ongoing offense.  The 
Associated Press report that came out within minutes of the Lawrence 
decision began as follows: 
The Supreme Court struck down a ban on gay sex Thursday, ruling that 
the law was an unconstitutional violation of privacy.  The 6-3 ruling 
reverses course from a ruling 17 years ago that states could punish 
homosexuals for what such laws historically called deviant sex.  Laws 
forbidding homosexual sex, once universal, now are rare.197 
 
 191. Id. (citing POSNER, supra note 14, at 341-50). 
 192. See, e.g., Halley, Reasoning, supra note 14. 
 193. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
 194. See id. at 575. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Edward Laumann et al., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL 
PRACTICES IN THE U.S. 98-99 (1994). 
 197. Associated Press, Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas Law Banning Sodomy (June 
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But as the Lawrence Court explains in its history of sodomy 
proscriptions, laws forbidding sodomy were once more common (though 
far from universal),198 not laws forbidding homosexual sex!  The story 
treats sodomy and homosexual sex as synonyms.  Worse still, they might 
easily have taken the language right out of a gay rights organization’s press 
release.199  This case was described from the outset as a gay rights victory, 
exactly what it would have been if the statute had been struck down on 
equal protection grounds.  It was, however, struck down as a violation of 
substantive due process, making it much more than a gay rights victory, or 
at least it can be described as more. 
It was a victory for sex.  It was a victory for everyone who wants to 
engage in oral or anal sex or live in a country where other people can do 
those things even if they themselves do not have the desire. 
The muddled equation of sodomy and gay identity should not be 
accepted uncritically, partly because to do so is to acquiesce to Justice 
Scalia’s reasoning in his Romer dissent.200  It must be constitutionally 
permissible, Scalia reasoned, to discriminate against gay people since “the 
conduct that defines the class [is] criminal.”201  It is not unconstitutional to 
discriminate against bank robbers, right?202  The conduct defines the class.  
As long as the military continues to proscribe sodomy, for example, and 
sodomy is equated with same-sex sex, it is difficult to imagine that people 
identified as gay will be well-treated in that institutional setting. 
But in addition, the facts on the ground, as discussed above, are more 
complex than an easy procession from sodomy to gay identity would allow.  
Civil rights litigators should not permit it.  They should drag heterosexual 
sodomy out of the closet, acknowledge the diversity of sexual orientations 
and practices, and insist that this case was a victory for everyone. 
By relying on the Due Process Clause, the Court awarded a victory to 
those on the side of sex, but it was an ambiguous one.  It is important now 
to be careful what this case comes to stand for.  Litigators should extract 
the potential for alliances that regard sexual acts as central,203 and resist the 
 
26, 2003). 
 198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568. 
 199. Press Release, Lambda Legal News Release, Landmark Ruling for Gay Civil Rights: 
U.S. Supreme Court Strikes Down Texas “Homosexual Conduct” Law (June 26, 2003), 
available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=1281 
(“U.S. Supreme Court today struck down Texas’s ‘Homosexual Conduct’ law, which 
criminalizes oral and anal sex by consenting gay couples . . . .”). 
 200. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996). 
 201. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 202. See id. 
 203. Halley, Reasoning, supra note 14, at 1731. 
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lure of relying on gay identity as the only launching pad for legal 
challenges to unjust sex laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawrence v. Texas contains a landmark ruling that will change the lives 
of people who might otherwise have faced criminal prosecution and public 
humiliation, and who might have been harassed or brutalized by police, 
prison guards, or fellow inmates.  It has the potential also to change the 
lives of parents who have been denied custody of or visitation with their 
children because they were presumed criminals, and of people who would 
have been discriminated against in a host of employment or other 
contexts204 while courts that might have helped them rested instead on the 
poisonous precedent of Bowers v. Hardwick.205 
It is a great moment, but I would hate to see pro-sex litigators or 
constituencies become complacent.  I would hate to see them make the 
mistake of believing that words that bring them so much joy today could 
 
 204. Watkins v. Unites States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 205. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  Another significant cause for optimism that we can take 
from Lawrence is that it speaks to a larger change in the world around us, just as Romer did, 
and just as every other civil rights victory in the nation’s history has.  Contrary to Justice 
Scalia’s contention that the Court has acted on attitudes prevalent among the legal elite but 
incompatible with the mainstream, the Court has never behaved in that way.  Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  It has never held the country 
hostage to views utterly out of step with the rest of the electorate.  This is not to say that it 
has never decided a divisive issue.  We are all familiar with President Eisenhower’s 
deployment of the 101st Airborne Division into Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce the 
integrationist dictates of Brown.  See EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 
1954-1965, PART II: FIGHTING BACK (Blackside, Inc. 1987).  The Court also faces 
acrimonious protest every year on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade.  BBC News Online, U.S. 
Abortion Debate Intensifies (Jan. 22, 2003), at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/america/2663071.htm.   
  Judges, though, are human beings like the rest of us.  They panic in wartime, just 
like the majority of the electorate, as evidenced by the disgraceful decision in Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and they also usher in change that is already on its way, 
such as when the first equal protection victories for women who had faced sex 
discrimination came down at exactly the same time that the second wave feminists were 
shuttling the Equal Rights Act through Congress and the state legislatures.  E.g., Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Twiss Butler & Paula McKenzie, Nat’l Org. for Women, 
21St Century Equal Rights Amendment Effort Begins (Mar. 11, 2005), at 
http://www.now.org/nnt/01-94/era.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2005).  Notwithstanding 
Justice Scalia’s charge that Lawrence was a rogue decision issued by a Court that has signed 
onto the “homosexual agenda,” the Court, as the old saying goes, has no army.  See 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Samuel Issacharoff, The 
Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 70 (“The Court’s 
authoritypossessed of neither the purse nor the swordultimately rests on sustained 
public confidence in its moral sanction.”).  If the nation were not primed for this decision, 
history tells us, we would not have gotten it. 
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not possibly bring them pain tomorrow.  There has been ample time to 
revel in Lawrence’s advances, but sodomy’s future remains uncertain.  
Legal actors interested in maximizing the room for benign sexual variation, 
minimizing the suspicion and politics of shame that plague sex, and 
interrupting the cycle that reproduces the injured gay identity should take 
legal realist stock of this case’s conceptual pillars.  They should confront 
boldly the fact that these concepts already have been turned around to 
disadvantage people who engage in sodomy and reconceptualize where 
possible to avoid future hazards.  My call is for vigilance so that the next 
generation can experience a victory like Lawrence. 
 
